This report on digital rights in Azerbaijan is prepared by non-governmental organization Participation House. Established in 2022, PH seeks to advance the protection of human rights in Azerbaijan by monitoring, capacity-building and litigation work.

The aim of this particular report is to provide a comprehensive overview of both online and offline human rights, emphasizing the need for safeguarding these rights in the digital realm. The analysis covers cyberattacks and physical attacks monitored in 2023, legal and practical shortcomings, and proposes recommendations for improvement.

The report underscores that digital freedoms are integral to human rights and are interconnected with various international human rights recognized by the United Nations and emphasizes the importance of ensuring that people’s online rights are respected and fully protected.

The findings reveal a concerning rise in cyberattacks in Azerbaijan, particularly targeting activists, journalists, and human rights defenders. These attacks include hacking, phishing, DDoS attacks, and dissemination of personal information, with allegations of government involvement in some cases. The report also outlines instances of physical attacks, such as the confiscation and brutal interference with electronic devices, limiting the freedom and security of individuals.

Legal and practical shortcomings are identified, including imprecise surveillance standards, lack of safeguard in ensuring data privacy, and restrictive laws on freedom of expression online. The absence of effective investigations into reported cybercrimes raises significant concerns about protecting individuals’ rights and ensuring accountability.

Recommendations include strengthening legal safeguards by reviewing and amending legislation, enhancing cybersecurity measures through the development of a unified law, promoting digital literacy, empowering civil society initiatives, conducting thorough investigations into reported cybercrimes, and engaging in international collaboration to strengthen digital rights protections.

In conclusion, the report calls for a combined effort from the government, civil society, and international partners to create an environment in Azerbaijan where digital freedoms are actively protected, principles of human rights are respected and accountability is ensured

2. Introduction

Participation House presents its first report on digital rights in Azerbaijan in 2023. This report has been prepared based on verification and analysis of information taken from media and other open sources.

Established in 2022, PH seeks to advance the protection of human rights in Azerbaijan. In addition to monitoring digital rights violations and attacks on freedom of expression online, PH provides litigation services and builds the capacity of civil society actors at risk.

The current report comprises monitoring results of violations of digital rights and freedom of expression online in 2023, analysis of key trends and legal shortcomings, and recommendations. The report demonstrates that digital rights are under constant threat, whereas freedom of expression in online settings is increasingly shrinking. The laws governing the area lack specificity and cohesion, alongside granting disproportionate power to authorities.

3. Digital Rights and Forms of Attacks

The core idea of granting all human rights to individuals from birth also applies to safeguarding rights and freedoms on the internet, which is becoming increasingly popular. Therefore, governments should ensure that people’s online rights are respected, protected, and fully protected. In fact, a resolution passed by the Human Rights Council of the United Nations in 2012 stated that human rights should be automatically safeguarded in the same way online.^[1]

A person’s digital rights encompass almost every aspect of their lives and, as a result, are often considered to be interconnected with all sorts of international human rights recognized by the UN.^[2] However, popularly, digital freedoms are often understood as highly related to expression, access to information, free assembly and association, as well as privacy and data protection online. They enable online access, free information exchange, and protection of personal data. They also protect individuals from threats and attacks when exercising these rights.

Cyberattacks involve unauthorized interference, theft, alteration, or sharing of information systems, devices, and data through various computer technologies. Unauthorized access and data interception, collectively known as hacking, involve various methods, such as hacking passwords through SMS interception or brute force. Phishing attacks occur when a specific user is deceived through email, calls, messages, or other means to steal personal information. Such attacks can result in the theft of personal information, online accounts, or even control over a device through malware. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks restrict ordinary users’ access to online information resources by overwhelming them with technical means, rendering the service practically unusable. Examples of cyberattacks include cyberbullying and online identity theft, where individuals impersonate others online, spread false information, share unauthorized pictures, send threatening messages, and engage in harmful communication. It’s expected that as technology advances, these attacks will become more sophisticated. To protect human rights from these attacks, various countries and organizations have been implementing measures through cybersecurity laws and policies since the late 20th century.

While digital rights are typically exercised online, their violations extend into the physical realm. Digital freedoms confront tangible threats through physical means, with individuals globally facing routine persecution and unjust penalties for expressing thoughts online. In addition to this repression, authoritarian regimes compound these violations by resorting to the confiscation of electronic devices, constituting a severe infringement on digital rights. Activists championing democracy are a prime target, with the theft and confiscation of computers and phones serving as tools for oppressive authorities to access sensitive information and compromise individual security. The subsequent atmosphere of control and intimidation persists even after devices are returned, as lingering fears of tampering and surveillance erode trust in the safety of digital tools. These physical attacks extend beyond personal security to include brutal methods used to obtain passwords, further hindering plaintiff’s trust in their digital tools and impeding their ability to communicate securely and handle critical information. In authoritarian contexts worldwide, the combination of device confiscation and brutal password obtainment underscores a pervasive infringement on digital rights, significantly limiting the freedom and security of individuals and organizations engaged in human rights advocacy.

In recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in cyberattacks in Azerbaijan. In the last five years, starting from 2018, at least 46 instances of cyberattacks against human rights advocates, activists, politicians, journalists, internet media, and other critics have been reported in the media.^[3] These attacks typically involve DDoS and phishing attacks, virus infections, interception of private communications, theft of personal information, unauthorized use for blackmail, and sometimes sharing of information without consent. In at least eight cases, it was alleged that the Azerbaijani government, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Service, was involved in these attacks.

Additionally, activists, human rights defenders and journalists have become regular targets of punishment for expressing thoughts online, alongside facing confiscation and brutal interference with devices of persons under police custody. Media and human rights organizations have reported dozens of such cases happened in between 2018-23.

The following sections will cover key trends observed in 2023 regarding cyberattacks and physical attacks targeting digital freedoms, whereas the following sections will elaborate on legal shortcomings enabling the violations and practical challenges negatively affecting the protection and promotion of digital rights.

This report will not dive into the internet freedoms in full extent considering the focus and cohesion. Thus, digital rights will be the primary focus and only a handful of matters pertinent to other internet freedoms will be discussed and analyzed throughout the report.

4. 2023 in trends

a) Cyberattacks targeting digital rights;

Hacking of media portals online accounts

On March 30, Samira Gasimli reported the hacking of the Facebook account of the media outlet — Red Line Channel.^[4] RLC is an independent media initiative airing political talk shows where guests take a critical approach to governmental policies. The hacker deleted all content from the past year, changed the page’s format, and altered the profile picture. It has effectively resulted in the media initiative losing touch with its followers and was perceived as a potentially political attack.^[5] The hacker’s Facebook profile, with over 40 friends, some potentially fake, has been identified as ‘Jn Alaza’. The RLC team has contacted Facebook to restore the deleted content, however, no legal action was considered at the time.

Another online media outlet, “Mikroskop Media” (mikroskopmedia.com) experienced a cyber attack resulting in the destruction of the site, as reported by co-founder Javid Abdullayev.^[6] On September 16, Abdullayev discovered that his login credentials were deemed incorrect, and upon investigation, it was revealed that the site had been hacked. The hackers demanded cryptocurrency for the site’s restoration, asking for approximately 25 thousand euros. IT specialists found that the admin panel was completely removed, some backups were deleted, and the content was data-locked. Despite the cyberattack being attributed to the Azerbaijani government, Abdullayev emphasized the complexity of the situation and the lack of a specific culprit. The first theory posited by Abdullayev suggested that the attack might be linked to articles published on the site about events in Karabakh.^[7] The site remained closed for technical work for some period hindering the professional work of the media outlet.

Hacking and dissemination of personal information of activists

Activist Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, currently under arrest, has fallen victim to the unlawful dissemination of his personal information, including intimate photographs and messages, reportedly stolen from his phone after his detention. Hajiyev was arrested in December 2022, accused of hooliganism and contempt of court, despite both domestic and international human rights organizations found the move as politically motivated due to his activist profile.^[8] In early 2023, videos and photos reportedly depicting Hajiyev’s personal and intimate correspondence with various women alongside other conversations were started to be shared on Facebook accounts and telegram channels.^[9] Colleagues and relatives assert that this act was orchestrated to discredit Hajiyev, with authorities failing to identify the culprits or provide a legal assessment.

B.Hajiyev and his lawyers later commented on the blackmail campaign accusing the law-enforcement agencies for cyberattack resulting in the dissemination of personal information and also stating that most circulated content is fake, some dating back a decade, suggesting Pegasus spyware as the potential means of compromising his personal data.^[10] Despite accusations against the government, the Ministry of Interior denies accessing Hajiyev’s devices during his detention. The Ministry announced that it started an investigation upon complaints from some women, however, no public information has been shared to date on legal measures.

Notably, it is not the first case where the personal correspondence of the activists, journalists and human rights defenders is disseminated online, a move considered as a punishment for socio-political activity. In 2020-2022, several cases have been reported where above mentioned groups have become victims of cyberattacks resulting in the leak of personal data online.^[11]

b) Physical attacks targeting freedom of expression online

Repression for freedom of expression online

In 2023, in at least 15 cases, activists, human rights defenders, bloggers and journalists have been summoned to police stations, detained and received administrative and criminal punishment for what appeared to be related to their posts online.

On September 21, a prominent activist, a member of Azerbaijan’s Alternative Confederation of Trade Unions, Afiaddin Mammadov was detained in front of his home.^[12] He was hit while detained and later accused of hooliganism and inflicting bodily harm on others. However, during his trial, the judge kept asking questions about his social media posts where he criticized the president and the recent battles in the conflict zone.^[13] Couple of other activists also faced persecution because of their anti-war posts online.^[14]

Another activist Amrah Tahmazov, posted a criticism directed at the president on his Facebook account on May 16 calling to free the political prisoner Alizamin Salayev. Police officers showed up on his doorsteps 3 days after the post and he was later detained on May 27. Tahmazov was accused of hooliganism and disobeying the police but both the activist and his friends found the charges bogus and related to his online posts criticizing the president and calling for peace.^[15]

Overall, the same tendency was observed in at least 15 cases where people were arrested due to their critical posts online.^[16]

Confiscation and brutal interference with devices and accounts

Moreover, in at least 3 cases, the personal devices and social media accounts of the detainees were confiscated and interfered with under police custody. Elmir Abbasov, a board member of the NIDA Youth Movement, was arrested and sentenced to 20 days for disobeying police, with the movement claiming the charges were false and linked to his Facebook post on the protests. Abbasov was released on July 11 and told the media that police forcefully took his phone and entered his social media accounts to delete the posts.^[17] Another journalist, Elmaddin Shamilzada, covering the Soyudlu protests in Gadabay District was later kidnapped and taken to the police station where he reportedly faced severe beating and pressure to give up the password of his Facebook account and delete the posts related to police violence.^[18]

c) Other restrictions on internet

The situation in Azerbaijan regarding internet freedoms reveals a pattern of persistent and disproportionate restrictions imposed by the government. The blocking of some of independent news websites (Meydan TV, Radio Liberty, Azadlig.info, Turan Information Agency and others) since 2017, ostensibly justified by allegations of promoting activities such as the forcible change of the constitutional order and mass riots, appears to lack credible evidence.^[19] The absence of effective and independent review processes further underscores the arbitrary nature of these actions.^[20] The government’s subsequent efforts to expand control over online platforms, including the blocking of news websites from other countries and social media platforms, such as blocking access to TikTok during escalations in September 2022 and 2023 indicate a widening crackdown on digital information dissemination.^[21]

Furthermore, the intentional and reversible nature of these restrictions is evident in the government’s actions during the visits by international organizations. The temporary lifting of website blocks during the visit of co-rapporteurs of the Council of Europe in June 2023, as reported by Meydan TV, suggests that the state has the capacity to manipulate and control internet access for diplomatic or public relations purposes.^[22] The blocking of circumvention tools and the variance in censorship across different internet service providers indicate a comprehensive effort to suppress online dissent and limit the ability of citizens to access diverse sources of information. This systematic curtailment of internet freedoms reflects a troubling trend of government overreach and undermines the principles of free expression and access to information in Azerbaijan.

5. Legal and Practical shortcomings

a) Legislative shortcomings

Surveillance standards

The imprecision in surveillance standards and the disproportionate powers granted to law enforcement agencies significantly compromise personal data protection. While Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees data protection, the legislation lacks clear standards for the storage and destruction of information obtained through monitoring and eavesdropping.^[23] This ambiguity gives law enforcement agencies extensive freedom in handling personal information.

Namely, the legal landscape surrounding information monitoring and eavesdropping, as outlined in the Law ‘On Operative Search Activity’ and Code of Criminal Procedures, necessitates compliance with the law and court approval for such practices.^[24] Despite this requirement, a noteworthy exception in the law’s 10th article permits law enforcement agencies to conduct interception without a court order in cases involving serious crimes against the person or particularly dangerous crimes. Unfortunately, the absence of defined standards in national legislation regarding the storage and destruction of personal data obtained through monitoring creates a concerning gap, providing law enforcement agencies with extensive discretion in handling acquired information.

Complaint mechanisms

In the landscape of digital rights protection, Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR hereinafter) stands as a beacon, assuring citizens the right to effective legal protection, especially crucial in the realm of internet freedom.^[25] However, the Azerbaijani legal framework reveals critical gaps, particularly concerning wiretapping and surveillance measures, which pose a threat to citizens’ safeguards against violations.

Domestic legislation grants law enforcement agencies excessive powers rather than offering a shield for citizens. A closer look at the Criminal Procedure Code reveals a stark omission — while it outlines the rights of accused or suspected individuals, it lacks provisions for notifying those subjected to monitoring and listening measures.^[26] The principles of a human-centric approach to handling cybercrime stress the importance of informing users about potential monitoring, yet the Azerbaijani legal system fails to embody these principles.^[27] The absence of effective legal safeguards, creates a concerning scenario where citizens are left in the dark, unaware and defenseless. This glaring gap means that citizens are not only uninformed during the process but are also denied retrospective information about past monitoring measures. The absence of these crucial components not only deprives citizens of the opportunity to complain about potential violations but also directly undermines the right to effective protection enshrined in Article 13 of the ECHR.

Risks of Interference with personal data

In the ever-evolving landscape of digital rights, the role of private entities in safeguarding human rights is increasingly under scrutiny. International norms, exemplified by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), emphasize the need for businesses to conduct human rights due diligence.^[28] Yet, as the spotlight turns to the cyber realm, especially in the context of cyber-attacks against critics, the absence of clear obligations for business entities in Azerbaijan creates a concerning gap.

Unlike the robust standards outlined by the UNGP and GDPR, Azerbaijani legislation lacks specific norms compelling legal entities to assess and mitigate the potential negative impact of their operations on human rights.^[29] This omission leaves a void in defining the responsibilities of business institutions, particularly concerning the production, export, import, and services related to technologies enabling monitoring and eavesdropping. While Article 38.3 of the law ‘On Telecommunications’ outlines the confidentiality obligation for operators and providers, Articles 33.1.9 and 33.1.9-2 grant broad powers for on-site inspections by executive power and law enforcement agencies, risking unchecked interference with citizens’ personal data.^[30]

The absence of precise rules governing the acquisition, storage, and deletion of information by law enforcement agencies, coupled with the lack of legal safeguards, grants authorities unchecked access to personal data. This legal vacuum not only facilitates potential abuse but also contravenes international standards emphasizing the necessity, proportionality, and legality of any interference with human rights. In January 2019, after the rally demanding the release of Mehman Huseynov, who is considered a political prisoner, the police invited the rally participants to police stations and put pressure on them which pointed to the revelations of identity of protest participants through their phone numbers, raised concerns on compliance of telecommunication companies with their obligations regarding personal data protection and emphasized the urgent need for comprehensive legislation.^[31] shows.

Absence of specific umbrella law on cybercrimes and digital security

In the ever-expanding realm of cyberspace, where technology evolves at a rapid pace, the absence of a comprehensive cyber security law in Azerbaijan casts a shadow over the effective protection of digital rights. While Azerbaijan has laws addressing aspects of internet freedoms and personal data protection, a unified legal framework specifically dedicated to cyber security remains conspicuously absent. This void not only fails to keep pace with the escalating sophistication of cybercrimes but also raises concerns about the safeguarding of victims’ rights, including those of critics.

The evolving landscape of cybercrimes, from phishing and hacking to more insidious threats like identity theft and cyber bullying, demands a nuanced legal response. Presently, only the law ‘On information, informatization and information protection’ in Azerbaijan touches upon concepts like cyber incidents, threats, and attacks, providing sanctions for specific offenses and Articles 271-74 of the Criminal Code define sanctions for cases of interference, interception and access to information systems, computers and data..^[32] However, this legal landscape falls short when addressing a broader array of cybercrimes, such as total internet blockades or cyber violence against individuals. The absence of a dedicated cybercrime law not only leaves significant gaps in the legal arsenal against emerging threats but also hinders the formulation of a robust defense mechanism for victims.^[33] A comprehensive and uniform law on cyber security is not a panacea, but it stands as a crucial opportunity to rectify existing legislative shortcomings and adapt to the evolving nature of digital threats, ensuring a more resilient and protected digital environment for all.

Restrictive laws curbing freedom of expression online

In 2022, Azerbaijan enacted the law ‘On Media’ with the purported aim of enhancing journalistic professionalism and fostering public trust.^[34] However, this legislative initiative encountered significant international and domestic scrutiny, gaining widespread criticism for curbing the freedom of expression both online and offline. Critics raised substantive concerns regarding the law’s lack of clarity, its provision of excessive regulatory authority to government entities, and its potential infringement on freedom of expression, notably contravening Article 10 of ECHR.^[35] Among other restrictions, the authorities are now granted power to penalize journalists and other users on social media networks for sharing information that is considered under broad umbrella of prohibited information.

Another law, widely criticized for its unnecessary restrictions upon freedom of expression online is the law ‘On Information, Informatization and Protection of Information’ dating 1998. On February 15, 2017, amendments to the law were proposed, discussed, and swiftly accepted, raising concerns about the law’s enactment without thorough deliberation. The legislative changes introduced a spectrum of measures aimed at regulating online content, emphasizing control mechanisms such as obligating website owners to disclose information, maintaining a list of prohibited content, and assigning responsibilities for content deletion to host providers.^[36] Despite these ostensibly valid concerns, the legislation’s shortcomings lie in its lack of precision, granting executive authorities broad discretion, and insufficient procedural safeguards.

Unsurprisingly, both laws have since been utilized by law-enforcement agencies in dozens of cases to penalize the users on social media for their posts online.^[37]

b) Practical Shortcomings

Lack of effective investigations

Despite legal provisions and designated institutions, there is a stark contrast between the theoretical framework and practical outcomes when it comes to the effective investigations into the cases of cyberattacks targeting human rights defenders, activists and journalists in Azerbaijan. Since 2017, at least 46 cases of cyber attacks against government critics have been reported where in at least 8 cases either victims or independent investigations attributed the attacks to the law-enforcement agencies, especially the Ministry of Internal Affairs.^[38]

However, as practice shows, authorities took a rather passive approach in investigating the allegations of cybercrimes against critics and openly refused to initiate investigations in various cases.^[39] While only a couple of victims chose to pursue the legal avenue to contest in court, the fact that none of these cases have resulted in effective investigation by authorities raises concerns about the application and enforcement of cybersecurity measures in Azerbaijan.These challenges become evident in specific cases highlighting the difficulties in investigating cybercrimes against critics. The overall lack of effective investigations into cybercrimes raises significant concerns about protecting individuals’ rights and ensuring accountability in Azerbaijan.

Lack of usage of legal avenues

This failure to conduct comprehensive investigations is perceived by victims as intentional reluctance, creating a significant deterrent for them to engage in the legal process. Instances of threats, cyber violence, and the exposure of personal correspondences have met with institutional disinterest and a lack of investigative rigor. This perceived reluctance by the government not only leaves cybercrimes unaddressed but also discourages victims from pursuing official complaints. The intentional inaction erodes victims’ trust in legal avenues, leaving them with limited recourse options and contributing to a climate where cybercrimes persist without accountability. The interplay between ineffective investigations and victims’ reluctance to lodge complaints underscores the urgent need for a more robust and responsive cybersecurity framework in Azerbaijan.

Lack of sustainable initiatives on digital literacy and strategic litigation

Civil society organizations play an important role in protecting and supporting victims of cybercrime. This support includes measures to support justice through both digital literacy and strategic litigation efforts. Vulnerability of at-risk groups, particularly activists and human rights defenders, to cyberattacks is exacerbated by poor online hygiene habits. Among individuals in these target groups, low levels of digital literacy, lack of detailed knowledge and skills about cyber security measures make them easy targets for cyber criminals and leave them vulnerable to threats.

In addition, both indifference on the part of official institutions and the lack of initiatives supporting the conduct of strategic litigation limit the opportunities for victims to pursue legal remedies and ensure justice. In such circumstances, it is important to create and support sustainable initiatives that incorporate strategic litigation and digital literacy to strengthen the resilience of individuals and communities against cyber threats.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

The digital rights landscape in Azerbaijan is marred by persistent challenges, encompassing cyberattacks, physical reprisals, and legal and practical shortcomings. The existing legal framework, while theoretically comprehensive, faces significant gaps in implementation and enforcement. Cyberattacks targeting activists, journalists, and human rights defenders have surged, reflecting an alarming trend. The government’s restrictive measures, including website blocking and denial of access, further curtail internet freedoms. Physical attacks, including detention, brutal interference with devices, and confiscation, compound the assault on digital rights.

Legal inadequacies contribute to the erosion of digital rights, as imprecise surveillance standards, disproportionate powers of law-enforcement agencies and restrictive laws undermine citizens’ privacy and hinder accountability. The absence of effective investigations into cybercrimes against critics and intentional reluctance perceived by victims exacerbate the issue. The interplay between legal gaps and practical challenges underscores the urgent need for a more robust and responsive cybersecurity framework. Moreover, lack of initiatives to provide litigation support to victims of cyber crimes further contributes to the environment of impunity in the light of growing number of violations.

Based on the analysis of the information provided in the report, PH recommends the following for the government, civil society organizations and international community to consider;

Calling on the government to ;

Reviewing, amending and repealing legislation where applicable to comply with international standards, such as of European Convention on Human Rights, guidelines of the European Court of Human Rights and best examples to

Ensuring transparency and clear guidelines on the retention and destruction of data seized by law enforcement agencies
Determining the exact rules regarding the notification of persons exposed to surveillance measures
Clarification of obligations of commercial entities regarding the privacy of personal data and elimination of disproportionate powers provided to law enforcement agencies
Removing unjustified bans on websites of independent media organizations, clarifying and tightening rules to prevent future unjustified bans
Ending political persecution for exercising freedom of expression on the Internet
Developing a unified cybersecurity law to deal with evolving cyber threats
Conducting comprehensive and effective investigative investigations into cybercrimes shared in media organizations or directly reported against activists, journalists and human rights defenders
Identification and prosecution of perpetrators of cyber-attacks to eliminate the climate of impunity

A call to Azerbaijani civil society and media organizations

Closely monitor and expose information on cybercrimes targeting government critics to increase awareness of cyberattacks
Developing a culture of digital hygiene, raising awareness among the general population to reduce vulnerability to cyber threats.

A call to international partners, civil society and intergovernmental organizations interested in Azerbaijan

Calling the Azerbaijani government to continuously fulfill its obligations arising from the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights
Creating programs and initiatives focusing on digital security and strategic litigation and involving relevant organizations and risk groups in Azerbaijan in these activities

The combination of legal reforms, cybersecurity enhancements, and proactive civil society initiatives is essential for safeguarding digital rights in Azerbaijan. PH believes that a concerted effort involving government, civil society, and international partners is necessary to create an environment where digital freedoms are respected, protected, and fully enjoyed by all citizens.

^[1] United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet : resolution / adopted by the Human Rights Council’, (2012), A/HRC/RES/20/8, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/731540?ln=en

^[2] Digital Freedom Fund, ‘Digital Rights Are Human Rights’, (2020), p. 3-19, https://digitalfreedomfund.org/digital-rights-are-human-rights/

^[3] Rustambayli M., ‘Azerbaijan Example of Cyber Attacks on Online Rights: Shortcomings in Legislation and Practice, Political Implications of Attacks’, (2023), https://ilnetwork.org/2023/06/29/kiber-hucumlarla-bagli-az%c9%99rbaycan-numun%c9%99si-qanunvericilikd%c9%99-v%c9%99-t%c9%99crub%c9%99d%c9%99-catismazliqlar/, [available in Azerbaijani]

^[4] Azerbaijan Internet Watch (AIW), ‘News platform’s Facebook page hacked, year worth of content deleted’, (2023). https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/news-platforms-facebook-page-hacked-year-worth-of-content-deleted/

^[5] Ibid

^[6] OC Media, ‘Azerbaijani news outlet Mikroskop taken down by ransomware attack’, (2023), https://oc-media.org/azerbaijani-news-outlet-mikroskop-taken-down-by-ransomware-attack/

^[7] Ibid

^[8] Bardell H., ‘Threats to life and safety of journalists and human rights defenders in Azerbaijan’, (2023), Council of Euorpe Parliamentary Assembly, paras. 17-20, https://rm.coe.int/threats-to-life-and-safety-of-journalists-and-hr-defenders-in-azerbaij/1680aaafa3

^[9]Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, ‘Jailed Azerbaijani Opposition Activists Private Photos and Messages Leaked’, (2023), https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/17367-jailed-azerbaijani-opposition-activist-s-private-photos-and-messages-leaked;

^[10] Meydan TV, ‘Bakhtiyar Hajiyevs Case: Personal Messages of the Activists are Disseminated on the Internet by Uknown Sources’, (2023), https://www.meydan.tv/en/article/bakhtiyar-hajiyevs-case-personal-messages-of-the-activists-are-disseminated-on-the-internet-by-unknown-sources/?tztc=1

^[11] AIW, ‘State Sponsored Harassment and Targeting in Azerbaijan is Very Much Alive and Kicking – a Year in Review’, (2023), https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/state-sponsored-harassment-and-targeting-in-azerbaijan-is-very-much-alive-and-kicking-a-year-in-review/; Rustambayli (n3)

^[12] AIW, ‘hearing in the case of activist reveals, it was his social media posts that had him arrested after all’, (2023), https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/hearing-in-the-case-of-activist-reveals-it-was-his-social-media-posts-that-had-him-arrested-after-all/

^[13] Ibid; Ulviyya Ali, ‘reporting from the trial’, (2023), Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ulviyyaaali/posts/pfbid0rPjECiUNMnT83zUt1vYZMvkscP4bPEzS3TUhQ9jwKP3iv2jTMJ8Gm2fV71cqHZuBl;

^[14] Jam News, ‘Arrests of “anti-war” activists in Azerbaijan’, (2023), https://jam-news.net/arrests-of-anti-war-activists-in-azerbaijan/;

^[15] Meydan TV, ‘Activist detained after social media post about Ilham Aliyev’, (2023), ’https://www.meydan.tv/az/article/ictimai-feal-ilham-eliyevle-bagli-yazdigi-statusdan-sonra-hebs-edilib/;

AIW, ‘Another activist sentenced over social media post’, (2023),

another activist sentenced over social media post

^[16] Voice of America, ‘PFPA member arrested’, (2023), https://www.amerikaninsesi.org/a/6972223.html, [available in azerbaijani];

AIW, ‘Religious activist claims his arrest was over his social media posts’, (2023),

https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/religious-activist-claims-his-arrest-was-over-his-social-media-posts/;

AIW, ‘Activist sentenced to 25 days in administrative detention over social media posts’, (2023),

https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/activist-sentenced-to-25-days-in-administrative-detention-over-social-media-posts/ ;

AIW, ‘Yet another activist detained over social media posts’, (2023),

yet another activist detained over social media posts [Updated January 17, 2024]

^[17] Voice of America, ‘Elmir Abbasov: I faced insults and violence while being taken to the police station’, (2023), https://www.amerikaninsesi.org/a/elmir-abbasov-polis-b%C3%B6lm%C9%99sin%C9%99-apar%C4%B1lark%C9%99n-t%C9%99hqir%C9%99-v%C9%99-zorak%C4%B1l%C4%B1%C4%9Fa-m%C9%99ruz-qalm%C4%B1%C5%9Fam-/5833943.html, [available in azerbaijani]

^[18] AIW, ‘Blogger accused of disobeying police’, (2023), https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/blogger-accused-of-disobeying-police/;

AIW, ‘Activist taken from his home after a social media post’, (2023),

AIW, ‘Journalist removes social media posts under duress’, (2023), https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/journalist-removes-social-media-posts-under-duress/

^[19] Freedom House, ‘Azerbaijan: Freedom on the Net 2023 Country Report’, (2023), https://freedomhouse.org/country/azerbaijan/freedom-net/2023, (Freedom on the Net 2023)

^[20] European Human Rights Advocacy Center’, ‘European Court; Azerbaijani Government has case to answer over blocking of news websites’, (2019), https://ehrac.org.uk/en_gb/european-court-azerbaijani-government-has-case-to-answer-over-blocking-of-news-websites/

^[21] Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), ‘Azerbaijan and Armenia block TikTok amid border clashes’, (2022), https://ooni.org/post/2022-azerbaijan-and-armenia-blocks-tiktok/;

AIW, ‘Azerbaijan temporarily suspends access to TikTok [updated October 31, 2023]’,(2023), https://www.az-netwatch.org/news/azerbaijan-temporarily-suspends-access-to-tiktok/

^[22] Freedom on the Net 2023 (n19)

^[23] E-qanun.az, Constitution of the Republic of the Azerbaijan, (2023), https://e-qanun.az/framework/897 Constitution

^[24] Ministry of Internal Affairs, ‘Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan about Operative Search Activity’, (2023), article 10, https://mia.gov.az/en/legislation/1/view/2/;

E-qanun.az, ‘The Code of the Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan’, (2000), 907-İQ, articles 177.3.5, 443, 445, https://www.e-qanun.az/framework/46950; (CCP);

Abbasov E., ‘Inviolability of Private Life Online in Azerbaijan’, (2022), https://aihmaz.org/az%C9%99rbaycanda-onlayn-m%C9%99kanda-s%C9%99xsi-h%C9%99yatin-toxunulmazligi-emin-abbasov/#_edn18; Rustambayli (n3)

^[25] Council of Europe, ‘European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950’ (1950), ETS 5, article 13, (ECHR)

^[26] CCP, article 259.1

CCP, article 19.4.2

^[27] Council of Europe, ‘Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights Right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence’, (2022), paras. 603-5, https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/guide_art_8_eng;

^[28] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Protect, respect and remedy : a framework for business and human rights : report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie’, (2008), A/HRC/8/5, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf;

GDPR.EU, ‘A guide to GDPR data privacy requirements’, (2023), https://gdpr.eu/data-privacy/

^[29] Rustambayli (n3)

^[30] E-qanun.az, ‘Law on Telecommunications’, (2005), 927-IIQ, articles 17.4, 33.1.9, 33.1.9-2, 38.3a,

^[31] Meydan TV, ‘Call by police to protest participants…’, (2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RaBHxjU2Ig

^[32] E-qanun.az, ‘Law on information, informatization and protection of the information’, (1998), 460-IQ, articles 2, 20-3:6, https://e-qanun.az/framework/3525, Law on information;

E-qanun.az, ‘Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan’, (1999),787-IQ, articles 271-4, https://e-qanun.az/framework/46947

^[33] Rustambayli (n3)

^[34] E-qanun.az, ‘Law on Media’, (2023), 471-VIQ, https://e-qanun.az/framework/49124

^[35] Council of Europe, ‘Azerbaijan media law: overregulation in an already restrictive environment’ (2022), https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/azerbaijan-media-law-overregulation-in-an-already-restrictive-environment;

Committee of Ministers of The CoE, ‘1451st meeting (December 2022) (DH) – Rule 9.2 – Communication from an NGO (27/10/2022) (Legal Education Society) in the case of Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 65286/13)’, (2022), paras 7-11, https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/?i=DH-DD(2022)1211E

^[36] Aihmaz.org, ‘Internet freedoms; legislation and practice in Azerbaijan’, (2022),

^[37] Submission by LES (n35), para 8.

^[38] Rustambayli (n3)

^[39] Ibid

Digital Rights and Forms of Attacks

1. Executive Summary